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Abstract 
The purpose of corporate governance as the protector of shareholder interests is a view that is still 
widely held.  Recently it has been subject to repeated challenge.  A new conception of governance 
that recognises a plurality of interests, particularly those of employees, has received both theoretical 
attention and practical examination.  This paper examines the connection between liberal and 
communitarian philosophy in the recent debate about corporate governance.  Empirical evidence 
from a critical ethnography is used to show how communitarian ideas can influence the governance 
model of a medium-sized company, and also how social influences constrain and frustrate the 
application of these ideals.  The result is a formal statement of culture built through a process of 
consultation, and institutionalised in contractual rights and responsibilities.  The company leaders 
have been drawn towards models of control and ownership found in the employee-owned and 
co-operative sectors.  These are perceived to increase participation and involvement, and give voice 
to more people in the enterprise.  During debate and discussion, however, the management group 
reduced the powers initially proposed for the governing body, and empirical data suggests this was 
partly to win support from those sceptical about the proposals, partly to protect decision-making 
powers, and partly to protect the company from the inexperience of non-executives.
© Rory Ridley-Duff, 2004  Communitarian Governance 
MCA Conference, 2004 1 Herriot-Watt University, Edinburgh 
Introduction 
This paper investigates the way that liberal and communitarian philosophies affect notions of 
corporate governance.  Custom Products Ltd – a medium-sized business based in the north of 
England – has evolved a model of governance over a 15-year period.  Throughout 2003, the directors 
investigated a number of new models from the employee-ownership and co-operative sector and used 
ideas from them to create new models for management, governance and ownership. 
Based upon a critical ethnography conducted over an 18-month period – including a 7-month period 
of intensive participant observation - the paper describes the intentions, concerns, and 
communication strategies of the company leaders in their attempt to evolve their models of 
governance.  The result is an emergent theory of corporate governance that shows how liberal and 
communitarian philosophies manifest themselves in corporate governance. 
Evidence is evaluated from additional primary and secondary sources to critique the emergent theory 
and highlight issues with the practices that result.  This critique suggests that the behavioural model 
that underpins ideals of governance is a form of “liberal communitarianism” (Lutz, 2000:343), a 
distinct philosophical position which integrates aspects of both philosophical traditions. 
Individualist Philosophy 
The purpose of corporate governance as the protector of shareholder interests is a view that is still 
widely held (Berry, Broadbent and Otley, 1995; ICAEW, 1999; Coad and Cullen, 2001).  This view 
is bound up with individualist philosophy as far back as Plato, based on the concept of pure reason.  
Within this philosophical tradition, reasoning is a private thought process in which people can 
separate themselves from the world and think rationally about it.  The idea of pure reason is taken up 
in the writings of Locke, Smith, Hegel, Hobbes, Kant and Rawls.  Taken together, they establish a 
body of thought that decisions are based on rational self-interest and that it is possible to determine 
an “absolute” or “universal” truth about social phenomena. 
From a similar ontological stance different philosophers have applied this notion and suggested very 
different types of ideal society.  In a Hobbesian view, individual self-interest leads to inevitable 
conflict and a constant “state of war” (see Cladis, 1992; Gaus, 2003:62).  He argues that to counter 
this tendency, a sovereign power is required to bring order and social control.  Smith, on the other 
hand, regards the pursuit of self-interest as something that contributes to a common good.  He 
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contends that a great many people all pursuing self-interest results in the market’s “invisible hand” 
where equilibrium between producers and suppliers ensures the most good for the most people.  The 
resulting society – in which free-traders are in abundance – is one where economic power is 
distributed widely. 
Contemporary Debate 
Liberal philosophers have struggled to free themselves from the Enlightenment view that the 
application of reason reveals universal truths.  As Gaus (2003:2) states: 
Milton and Mill advance classic statements of a basic liberal theme.  Given freedom of thought, 
speech and inquiry, our common human reason leads us toward increasing agreement on truths 
and rejection of falsehoods. 
“Scientific” knowledge is believed to advance through positivist assumptions and the search for 
universal laws.  Rational economics – based on models of human behaviour that assume people act 
in individualistic profit-maximising ways – evolved from Adam Smith’s ideas about the division of 
labour (Smith, 1776) and Taylor’s doctrine of scientific management (Taylor, 1911).  Taylor broke 
down jobs into easy repetitive tasks, offered higher wages for those that were prepared to do them, 
and succeeded in demonstrating that productivity could be hugely increased by – in effect – bribing 
people into acting as component parts in the mechanics of production. 
A contemporary articulation of Smith’s views can be found in the work of Charles Handy (2002), 
who argues that we can only be truly at the service of other people when we are pursuing what we 
love to do.  But even Handy concedes that the only way to tame the market, and put capital at the 
service of humanity, is for people to discover their own social purpose.  Having discovered it, he 
argues – as do Smith and Rawls - that the mechanisms of a liberal market economy provide the 
freedom to pursue these to society’s best advantage. 
Rawls (1999:24) describes how scientific management ideas were transferred into the public domain: 
The nature of the decision made by the ideal legislator is not, therefore, materially different from 
that of an entrepreneur deciding how to maximize his profit by producing this or that commodity, 
or that of a consumer deciding how to maximize his satisfaction by the purchase of this or that 
collection of goods.  In each case there is a single person whose system of desires determines the 
best allocation of limited means.  The correct decision is essentially a question of efficient 
administration. 
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Governance, therefore, is seen as the enforcement of one person’s (or a ruling elite’s) vision.  
Although Rawls’ personal views are at variance with the above, his philosophy still amounts to a 
defence of private interests through publicly agreed minimum standards of rights.   
As Morrison notes, these views of organisational life are underpinned by the notion that “people tend 
to project onto the world the order they find in their minds” (Morrison, 1991:107).  The debate 
amongst liberal philosophers, therefore, has moved onto new ground.  How can we create the 
conditions in which people can deliberate together and find workable solutions in political, civil and 
business life while accepting that different ways of thinking and divergent opinions are inevitable? 
The Influence of Social Psychology 
Gaus (2003:9) describes the influence of psychology on liberal philosophy: 
Independently, psychological studies of human reasoning have led to doubts about whether 
everyone shares the same norms of reasoning.  The work of, amongst others, Richard Nisbett, Lee 
Ross, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky showed that normal adults often do not employ the norms of 
reasoning long-advocated as correct by philosophers. 
This view is backed by a large body of social psychology research (see Aronson, 2003).  The 
emerging view from this discipline is that people frequently engage in rational self-justification as a 
result of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) – a process by which they are influenced by their 
social context to adopt a course of action and then justify it to both themselves and others.   In doing 
so, their values change to match the actions they have been induced to follow – but only if there is an 
element of choice.  One key finding is that the more choice a person feels they have, the more they 
will internalise new values and adopt them as their own. 
As a result, liberal thought has begun to grapple with the idea that cognitive processes have a 
significant social element, and that different points of view are inevitable.  From Berlin to Gray, and 
Hobbes to Rawls, the debate has centred on how “collective reason” can be achieved in societies that 
are pluralist (Gaus, 2003:93).  John Rawls (Rawls, 1999:10) suggests a structure for society based 
on: 
..the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would 
accept in an initial position of equality…[that] specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be 
entered into and the forms of government that can be established. 
He argued that such principles would regulate all political life and be oriented towards the 
establishment and protection of basic individual freedoms that all “free and rational persons” could 
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pursue.  In the economic sphere, Rawls position was taken to strengthen the arguments originally put 
forward by Adam Smith.  Looser controls on trade (free markets), reductions in the power of the 
state and other monopolies (state businesses and trade unions) and policies to strengthen private 
ownership (houses and share ownership) would all lead to a more liberal and equitable democracy. 
Critiques of Individualist Views 
Rawls ideas have been critiqued on a number of fronts.  Philosophers from the tradition of Aristotle 
and Hume regard knowledge as a social creation.  Aristotle set out in Politics his view that people are 
social animals that have to participate in society (Aronson, 2003).  Hume supports the Aristotelian 
view that knowledge is linked to experience (Open University, 1981:229). 
It is only experience which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us 
to infer the existence of one object from that of another.  Such is the foundation of moral 
reasoning, which forms the greater of human knowledge, and is the source of all human action 
and behaviour. 
Another problem is the question that haunted Kant in particular: “Whence reason?” (Cladis, 
1992:18).  The principles that Rawls puts forward can only be the outcome of a political process and 
discourse.  The views of Giddens (1984, 1991) that we recursively evolve our own social structures 
suggests that rights are necessarily an outcome of social processes.  How, then, can they ever be 
primary and precede social life?   
Lastly, individualist philosophers are challenged on the nature of learning and knowledge creation.  
Philosophers from the existential school believe that reasoning is an outcome of interacting with the 
world.  It is based on experiential learning and, therefore, constrained (and enabled) by the social 
context in which it takes place.  This assumption can be found in the works of Marx, Engels, 
Rousseau, Durkheim, Mayo and Dewey.  
The Communitarian Critique 
Lutz (2000:343) describes two contemporary strands of communitarianism; the first he associates 
with a school of thought with "an inclination towards moral and cognitive relativism" and which he 
disparagingly calls republican communitarianism.  The second, a form he finds more congenial, 
stems from the thinking of Durkheim, Dewey and Hobhouse.  This line of thought has been 
developed in recent years by Etzioni (1995) and Tam (1999).  
© Rory Ridley-Duff, 2004  Communitarian Governance 
MCA Conference, 2004 5 Herriot-Watt University, Edinburgh 
Durkheim recognised individualist and communitarian philosophies as "two extreme positions 
around which moral theories are grouped" (Cladis 1992:1) and sought to find an explanation for the 
relationship between private and public that would avoid the tendency to reduce it to these two 
contrary positions.  He… 
…sought to protect liberalism from egoism, and communitarianism from fatalism, the absorption 
of individuals into the social mass.  The result was a social theory that articulated and promoted 
the dignity and rights of the individual within the moral idiom of social traditions and commitment 
to a common good… 
This is articulated persuasively by Etzioni (1998:xvi).  Describing the “apple that hit my forehead”, 
he recalls research in which young Americans overwhelmingly state their desire to be tried by jury.  
However, a substantial number of the same group also state that they do not wish to serve on a jury.  
It occurred to Etzioni that rights cannot be exercised without acceptance of responsibilities: the right 
to trial by jury can only be protected if we accept our responsibility to serve on juries.  The apparent 
tension between the primacy of rights and responsibilities dissolves and the debate moves to one 
where we seek to identify the responsibilities that protect corresponding rights.  Governance becomes 
a role through which community leaders take responsibility for protecting citizens rights through 
measures to encourage (and ensure) that all citizens fulfil their responsibilities. 
Etzioni’s position appeals to logic.  How can we exercise the right to education without some 
members of society taking responsibility for our education?  But herein lies a circular problem.  The 
character of that education will be deeply affected by the attitude of the educator.  If education is 
offered to serve the needs of the educator then the practices and outcomes will be different to an 
education offered to help students establish and pursue their own goals.  In short, it matters whether 
the educator is acting from individualistic or communitarian motives and how they perceive notions 
of the common good. 
Etzioni does, however, successfully communicate two key tenets of liberal communitarian thought; 
firstly a need to restore the balance between rights and responsibilities; secondly, that rights 
themselves cannot exist without social agreement on what responsibilities we are required to uphold.  
It is Tam, however, who extends these principles to the sphere of business (Tam 1999:10). 
Companies must learn to treat their workers, suppliers and customers, as well as their senior 
management and shareholders, as members of a shared community. 
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Cooperation in this context does not mean bargaining to secure the best advantage for one's own 
group with minimal concession to others, but to developing shared values and long-term goals so 
that each is ready to contribute to the well-being of the whole enterprise. 
In short, he argues against adversarial relations and argues that social and business problems require 
resolution through people learning to question and deliberate together.   
Tam, however, is unable to completely free himself from Enlightenment thinking.  While he accepts 
that many values may be culture or context specific, he claims there are four common values that 
"can be traced back thousands of years and across different cultures" (Tam 1999:16).  Love, wisdom, 
justice and fulfilment are the most deeply valued human experiences.   
While Tam defines these as shared values, psychologists argue that they may be grounded in innate 
human needs (Glasser, 1998, Aronson 2003).  Glasser speculates whether they are part of our genetic 
heritage, but Aronson takes the view that human beings – particularly those with high self-esteem - 
are protective of their own self-concept as good and decent people.  This leads them to articulate 
their own behaviour as good and decent, leading to divergent opinions about what constitutes good 
and decent behaviour.  Where such a person engages in a business enterprise and persuades other 
people to follow him or her, followers adopt the same (or similar) values to reduce the dissonance 
that arises if they challenge the values of those on whom they are dependant.   
As a result, there have been a number of challenges to the individualist view of corporate governance 
(Ellerman 1990; Turnbull 1994; Cornforth 1988, 1995; Major 1996, 1998; Major and Boby 2000, 
Johnson 2004).  A new conception of governance that recognises a plurality of interests has received 
both theoretical attention (Turnbull 1994, Coad and Cullen 2001, Ridley-Duff 2002) and practical 
examination in studies (Whyte and Whyte 1991; Kasmir 1996; Lutz 1997; Cheney 1999; Coad and 
Cullen 2001). 
In the following section we consider the methodology and methods used to capture and analyse data 
from the primary case study and additional sources.  Then we will examine the extent to which 
communitarian values are expressed in the business practices of three organisations. 
Methodology 
There are two key aims in this research.  Firstly to describe the formal and informal culture 
(Buchanan & Huczynski, 1997) in a company that has a communitarian model of behaviour.  This 
requires that I describe the culture from the perspective of its participants (not forgetting that I am 
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also a participant).   Secondly, I need to analyse the underlying philosophy and values implicit in the 
behaviour of participants.  In this section, we look at the methodological implications of exploring 
these two dimensions of organisational life. 
Description of the Behavioural Model 
The primary case study was undertaken to explore how employees are affected by the application of 
communitarian ideas in governance.  This requires a descriptive approach as there is no hypothesis to 
test.  Hypothetico-deductive techniques are inappropriate but we do not have to abandon positivist 
assumptions that there is an external reality.  Nor do we have to discard the aim of representing the 
phenomenological world of the participants in an authentic way. 
Ethnography, with its combination of participant observation, interviews and document analysis, is 
an appropriate methodology.  The truth – at least initially – is the truth as seen by participants.  Its 
triangulated approach – using multiple sources of data, and a mixture of methods to collect data - 
enables a researcher to claim that the phenomena described are authentic and a good basis for further 
theorising. 
Philosophy, Values and Meanings  
Having described the set of attitudes and values implicit in the model, the focus will turn to the 
justifications for it, and the meanings that participants assign to it when interpreting events and 
making decisions.  To examine this area, I present the formal statements of culture and examine how 
managers rationalise and justify them.  I then examine how participants interpret them and the extent 
to which they believe the formal statements of culture match their own experience.  In doing so, I 
share critical theory’s epistemological and ontological assumptions, and propose to draw on its tools 
and techniques of analysis. 
This takes us beyond what Johnson and Duberley call “conventional ethnography” and sets us on the 
path of “intensive analysis concerned with combining interpretive understanding, causal analysis and 
critique” (Johnson and Duberley, 2000:135).  The study is a critical ethnography (Thomas 1993) in 
which there is a search for the nature of ideological hegemony and explanation of mismatches 
between publicly stated philosophy and the private philosophies employed by individuals operating 
within its framework. 
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One of the key choices of the ethnographer is the extent to which they immerse themselves in the 
culture, or restrict their role to observation (Gill and Johnson, 2002).  I proceeded on the basis that 
my own subjective experiences would assist me in understanding organisational life, and help me 
empathise with other organisation members.  I accepted the view that "the researcher's knowledge of 
his own feelings becomes a vital source of data" (Gill and Johnson, 2002:145).   
I asked the person acting as my line manager – as far as was possible – to treat me in the same way 
as other organisation members.  I also took opportunities to expose myself to experiences that would 
provide me with as much insight as possible into the thoughts and feelings of others.  In my journal, I 
recorded more than descriptions; it included data on my own feelings and thoughts about the 
experience of working as an employee. 
Theory Building 
In constructing theoretical explanations, and exploring disparities between public and private 
philosophies, I have chosen to draw on the techniques of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
However, the final objective is not to build a neutral theory to explain social life, but to show how 
different interests influence social relations.  In particular, I will show how the interests of the 
organisation leaders in using governance as an agent of change has produced different sets of social 
relations. 
Methods 
Data was collected between October 2002 and March 2004 – a period of nearly 18 months.  For 7 
months, I worked inside the organisation for approximately 20 hours per week.  I also participated in 
social events, weekend and evening shifts, and socialised with some staff in the evenings.  During the 
summer months I worked for 12-hours each week in the Operations area where value-added 
manufacturing activities, packing and dispatch took place. 
Throughout the whole study, I made journal entries each time I was in contact with the organisation.  
Due to the large amount of contact, many of these had to be recorded on a digital dictaphone and 
summarised and analysed at the end of the data collection period.  In order to ensure that analysis 
took place during data collection, the journal was used to capture both descriptive material and 
reflections on the processes within the company, the evolution of my thoughts, comments on how 
relationships with people changed over time, and reflections on how reading affected my 
interpretation of events in the workplace. 
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As it is a principle of Grounded Theory to set aside theoretical reading during data collection and 
analysis (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Partington 2000, Locke 2001), I limited reading to those books 
that were in active circulation inside the company.  This was intended to help me understand the 
influences on their thinking, how these informed their actions, and also to enable me to engage in 
more meaningful discussions with a range of people. 
To focus on corporate governance I participated in initial discussions on changes, a field trip, board 
meetings, management meetings and company-wide meetings throughout the whole research period.  
I was invited to give input into early discussions with two directors.  Once the proposals went to the 
board, my input was more limited, but still sought from time to time.  Once the proposals were 
submitted to managers and staff, my input diminished further and I played an observational role. 
I collected additional documents: minutes of board meetings, powerpoint presentations prepared by 
directors for managers and staff; working documents created to assist discussion of the principles for 
new governance and ownership arrangements.  One of these – a submission to a DTI consultation – 
became a focal point for discussion and agreement about the principles of governance that should 
apply to the company.  The way these proposals were modified during board discussions is discussed 
in the next section. 
Additional primary data was collected from SoftContact Ltd to compare the development of 
communitarian objectives and management practices in the two companies.  As I held a senior 
position, I was able to access e-mail correspondence, documents, constitution, business plans, staff 
appraisals, and witness statements to an employee tribunal.  SoftContact Ltd comprises two 
organisations; a common ownership co-operative and an employee-owned sister business.  The way 
democratic values were re-interpreted over a thirteen-year period, particularly in the formation of the 
employee-owned business, is helpful to this research. 
The last set of primary data was collected on a 2-day field trip to the Mondragon Corporacion 
Cooperativa (MCC).  This trip served a dual purpose.  Firstly, it was a chance to interact with and 
study two of the directors from Custom Products Ltd.  Secondly, it provided an opportunity to collect 
primary data on another comparison company.  Our host Mikel Lezamiz, organised a series of 
interactive lectures on governance and philosophy, arranged a tour of one company, and a visit to the 
entrepreneurial unit based in the local university.  This was supplemented by informal discussions 
over the lunch table.  I took notes throughout and wrote these up as part of the journal. 
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On our return from Mondragon, I participated in follow up discussions (2 hrs each) with the two 
directors from the primary case study company in order to capture their interpretations and reactions.  
Interpreting primary data was assisted by further reading (Oakeshott 1990; Whyte and Whyte 1991, 
1998; Morrison 1991; Turnbull 1994; Kasmir 1996; Lutz 1997; Cheney, 1999). 
To analyse data I made summary notes of all journal entries up to the end of August 2003 (the end of 
the work placement) and reviewed all manual notes of board meetings, management meetings and 
company presentations.  I used NVivo to do text analysis, but found that working on paper was also 
useful in sketching emergent theories while writing up journal entries.   The theories were 
authenticated and developed by constantly comparing them against newly summarised journal data, 
and by using opportunities for ongoing contact with members of the company to authenticate my 
findings. 
All methodologies have their limitations.  Ethnography’s strongest claim is that it can “penetrate the 
various complex forms of misinformation, fronts, evasions and lies’ that are considered endemic in 
most social settings” (Gill and Johnson, 2002:145).  But this strength leaves the researcher deep in 
the contestable world of social meaning, relying on their own interpretative skills to authenticate 
findings.  Triangulation, of both methods and data sources, can assist in determining the course of 
events.  In the sphere of behavioural and linguistic meaning all claims are open to challenge.  The 
ethnographer’s best hope is to capture an authentic interpretation, rather than an unchallengeable 
truth. 
In this research, I was able to actively participate in (and observe) different work settings.  All these 
activities were documented in a daily journal, and contemporaneous notes were taken at pre-arranged 
meetings.  A few meetings were recorded and transcribed.  Interviewing was often ad-hoc and 
haphazard.  Note-taking was not always possible due the informal and diverse settings in which 
chance meetings took place.  This inevitably affects the scope for triangulation during analysis. 
Lastly, this paper was written at the half way stage of a 3-year research project.  Further data analysis 
and reflection may result in the amendment of theoretical claims.  Therefore any theoretical 
contribution in this paper should be regarded as provisional and tentative. 
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Case Studies 
Custom Products Ltd is a 15-year old company in the North of England that has established itself as a 
market leader.  It buys in products from a number of suppliers and decorates them for different 
markets.  The company was established by its current Managing Director in the late 1980s: he 
currently holds 55% of the equity of the company.  Using a number of recognised measures, the 
company would be regarded as successful.  In 1999, it was listed as one of the fastest growing 
companies in the UK.  In 2002 and 2003 it won awards for customer service and the development of 
its staff.  In 2002, its profits approached £1m. 
About 50% of staff have small shareholdings with the majority (over 80%) in the hands of directors 
and early supporters1.  In early 2004, proposals were agreed to transfer 51% of the directors’ shares 
into an Employee Share Ownership Trust (ESOT) in order to protect the company’s values and 
ensure that there is internal control over future decisions.  This also provides an exit route for the 
founders whose shares will be purchased through a bank loan that will be repaid out of future profits.  
Linked to this is a proposal to establish an elected Council with powers to appoint and remove the 
MD.  The directors regard this body as “guardians of the culture” with responsibility to review the 
social impact of business plans and policies. 
The proposals were influenced by the other case study companies.  In 2002, the MD of Custom 
Products approached SoftContact Ltd to establish a dialogue over democratic constitutions and 
organisation change.  In early 2003, directors from Custom Products Ltd visited the MCC to learn 
more about democratic governance arrangements and the problems and benefits of greater worker 
involvement in governance. 
Control Through Culture 
The company has a public statement of its culture that is communicated to potential recruits in the 
form of a leaflet which outlines the early history of the company and how the two founders pursued 
their own “agenda for the kind of working environment they wanted and the values that they 
intended to uphold”.  In a key passage, the “essence” of the company is described. 
                                                 
1
  People who bought shares during the start-up phase of the company’s development. 
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The essence of [the company] is centred on the ideal of a group of people sharing common goals 
and values, with a culture based upon equality of respect and tolerance.  The [company] exists 
primarily to enhance the lives of all those employed within it. 
I was able to verify with many members of staff that the process of developing shared values did 
include all members of the company and was perceived by many participants to be a genuinely 
inclusive process.  However, when I later observed one of these company-wide events and the 
presentation techniques used to communicate new ideas, feelings about the way shared values were 
established varied widely.  Many enthusiastically involved themselves in discussions, but some were 
confused about what to think and took refuge in asking the opinions of others.  People on one 
particular table expressed the view that it was “an insult to any thinking person” and “an exercise in 
manipulation”.   One of the more cynical participants commented: “if you ask the right questions, 
you’ll get the answers you want.” 
The other case study companies – Mondragon and SoftContact – made similar attempts to create a 
formal statement of culture.  During the field trip to Mondragon, Mikel (a director of 
the management school) outlined the 10 key principles agreed at a congress and adopted by each 
member business after debate and a vote.  When Mikel heard us use the word equilibrio, his eyes lit 
up and he became very animated.  He grabbed a pen and balancing it on the tip of his finger he said 
“always the balance”.  Later, while again balancing the pen on the tip of his finger, he used phases 
such as “we do the business, we do the philosophy” or “we do the ‘social’, we do the ‘economic’”. 
In SoftContact’s spin off company, a statement of Guiding Principles formulated by the founding 
members is included in the company mission statement.  This was prominently displayed in the 
company entrance and also printed as the second page of the business plan distributed to every 
member of staff.  The notion of rights and responsibilities is implicit in the following clause: 
Membership not employment – Staff who work in our company are members not just employees.  
Each member must fulfil their obligations in order to earn their rights regarding governance of 
the company. 
Recruitment and Induction 
At Custom Products Ltd, the recruitment and induction process has been organised so that people 
will deselect themselves if they feel that they are incompatible with the company culture. 
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• Application forms are not sent out (except to sales reps) – the company organises a short tour 
of the offices/warehouse.  If a person is not prepared to attend a tour, they effectively deselect 
themselves. 
• The tour is designed to give information on the company, salary levels and flexible working 
so that people who do not like what they hear do not apply. 
• The application form states that CVs are not accepted in order to prevent applications from 
job seekers whose interest is speculative. 
• The application form includes questions on personal philosophy and conflict handling – the 
covering notes say that if the applicant struggles to answer these questions then perhaps they 
should reconsider whether to apply. 
• Short-listed applicants are sent a leaflet and told to read and consider its content for the 
interview.  The leaflet includes the company’s vision statement and text that stresses that the 
applicant must satisfy themselves that they are willing to accept the responsibilities outlined 
in the document. 
• The first interview is ‘behavioural’ – each question is designed to test cultural compatibility.  
The behavioural interview enquires into the person’s upbringing, schooling and job history.  
It can take up to 3-hours (up to 2 hours for temporary staff).  HR staff look for evidence of 
behaviours that indicate a match to the company’s values (e.g. flexibility, interest in self-
development, sensitivity in conflict handling, support for others, recognition of interests 
wider than their own etc). 
In all these stages, the management rationale is that the process should deter people who are 
interested only in their own advancement or material (financial) gain.  After going through the 
interview myself, I recorded these reflections in the journal: 
It focuses on character, not technical skills, although technical ability will become manifest 
through the career development described by the candidate.  Anyone who is not reflective and 
thoughtful about their workplace and themselves will not score well in the interview process.  
Anyone who is not able to describe how they have dealt with conflict or disagreement will also not 
score well. 
The opinions of those who had come through the interview process were varied.  One member of 
staff regarded it as a “wacky interview”.  Some were amazed at the questions about personal 
philosophy.  Another found it strange but not difficult, and was impressed at the awareness of the 
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company’s understanding of culture.  Others reported that the experience was quite emotional, 
particularly when talking about close family members. 
Temporary members of staff who applied for permanent jobs but did not pass the interview were 
perplexed about the reasons.  One claimed that she had been labelled “too loud” and was openly 
hostile about not being given a job after several years as a temporary worker.  Another temporary 
member of staff was sad rather than angry: 
I could tell she was down – she was not her normal cheerful self.  I asked “have you got the job?”  
She had not.  She felt her inability to answer some questions counted against her.  “I just don’t 
know what they want from me.” 
The HR view is that people who do not understand why they have failed the interview “just don’t get 
the culture”.  However, some of those who have passed the interview take a different view.  Two 
people claimed there is no fairness at all, that selection depends on whether your face fits.  One man 
felt that the recruitment process selected people on the basis of how easily they could be 
manipulated. 
Managers and directors, however, put considerable faith in the interview process.  Even when a 
whole department challenged the directors over the rejection of a particular applicant, they rode out 
the conflict and refused to appoint the person.  One director took the view that the system had served 
the organisation well over a number of years and that they were right to trust it. 
Communicating Cultural Expectations 
The evolution of the behavioural model is described at seven voluntary culture classes.  In one class 
there was a discussion about recruitment and some class participants expressed the view that good 
people were not being taken on because of the way the interview was conducted and evaluated.  They 
were concerned that this was detrimental to the company: 
There was genuine concern amongst the people there at the potential pitfalls regarding 
recruitment and induction.  The MD made a robust defence of recruitment policy based on the 
argument that training people is easier than changing people's values.  He asked a question which 
I found strange, but which reveals a great deal about the rationale for their recruitment policy:  
"Is it morally right to try to change a person's values?" 
He clearly thought not, hence his concern to select people whose values matched those set out by 
existing members. 
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In a follow up discussion with another director, I discussed the system of assignments used to assist 
selection of future team leaders and managers.  I felt this provided a sophisticated level of control 
over promotions and allowed the person who marked the assignment to act as a “gatekeeper” of the 
culture: 
Director: There are control mechanisms in every organisation where people feel pressure if they 
want to advance their careers, we are not so different. 
Researcher: At SoftContact Ltd there was no “appointment” system for managers, but inevitably 
people assumed management roles (otherwise the place would not have functioned).  This led to a 
paper in which we put together an understanding of the way management responsibilities were 
assumed.  It was conceived as a person’s evolution: Trainee – Professional – Expert – Manager:  
I don’t think your system is wrong – just that there are outcomes of the system in place due to 
different cognitive models.  Do you think we become trapped by our cognitive models? 
Director: Very interesting – and to a degree we are “trapped” by our own models.  Schema 
theory suggests that we wouldn’t be able to function effectively if we didn’t have these pre-formed 
schemas through which we view the world.  Obviously, these schemas are influenced by a variety 
of things such as personality, genes, values, experience and the interplay of each of these on the 
others. 
Another director felt that the assignments were not the final determinant of appointments.  He could 
not recall anyone who had been proposed and seconded at board level being denied a promotion and 
was uncomfortable with the concept that his colleague was a “gatekeeper”. 
The classes were very enjoyable and I learned a lot, but I had two significant concerns which I fed 
back through the assignments.  The first was a lack of balance in the focus on responsibilities and 
rights: 
I feel there may be over emphasis on upholding responsibilities and insufficient attention to 
upholding the rights of others.  There seems to be a presumption that rights will be upheld 
automatically, but my experience suggests that rights can get ignored too, particularly in 
self-management situations.  Has a team member ever felt a colleague is not receiving a ‘Fair 
Reward’ for example – and acted on that feeling?  Not an easy step to take, one that leaves you 
feeling in a vulnerable position if opposed. 
Secondly, I felt that staff were being encouraged to see their own workplace as much better than 
other workplaces in an uncritical way.  In one session this became so extreme that I commented on 
the self-congratulatory character of the discussion: 
In the discussion, we drew positive examples from our company and negative examples from other 
employment.  I felt this inclined the group towards a utopian view which did not help the learning 
experience.  While I know it is a lovely place to work, it might have invited more critical reflection 
if we had also been asked for positive examples from other workplaces and negative examples 
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from ours.  Then – I believe – we would have got real balance into the debate rather than “We, 
Good, Others Bad” kind of attitude. 
Managers acknowledged both these points in a follow up meeting to discuss changes for the future. 
Control Through Pay Policy 
Surplus Sharing 
The policy of Custom Products Ltd was to pay local market wages regardless of the profitability of 
the company.  On top of this, after setting aside monies for reinvestment in stock, some of the 
end-of-year surpluses were distributed to all permanent staff (excluding temporary workers).  
Surpluses are distributed in the form of dividend payments to shareholders, profit-share for every 
member of staff (equal amounts), and profit-related pay distributed pro-rata according to salary. 
A 55-page document includes Appendices B and C that outline the Profit Share and Share Ownership 
schemes as they stood in 2000.  The rationale is clearly stated. 
1. Encourage maximum turnover from customers 
2. Encourage maximum cost savings through greater efficiency and improved supplier rates 
Depending on the level of profit, between 5% and 12.5% of profits are allocated to a Profit Pool: 
35% of this is distributed equally; 65% is distributed according to “extra-hours” worked 
(accumulated units over the course of the whole year). 
The share ownership scheme committed the company to offering at least 20% of shares to 
non-director employees after the company had been in existence for 20 years.  This process was 
taking place.  On a show of hands at a company wide consultation, it was clear that approximately 
50% of staff held some shares although the exact percentage held by non-directors was unclear.  
Everybody I spoke to said the shares had been a good investment for them. 
At Mondragon, a much greater percentage of surpluses/losses (up to 45%) are distributed to 
individual “social accounts” held by the local bank (Field Notes 2003).  Our host claimed that after 
about 20 years service, workers accumulate in the region of £100,000 in their social accounts and 
proudly waved his bank book to illustrate the point.  Similar claims appear in the literature on 
Mondragon (see Oakeshott, 1990; Morrison, 1991). 
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Although not technically owning shares, the joining fee entitles members to a share of surpluses and 
the organisation’s assets.  As there are strict rules about wage differentials, the distribution of 
surpluses to the workforce is more widespread and equitable than at Custom Products Ltd.  Members 
can sell their co-operative, but our host said that this was a low priority and considered a “bad 
dream” by those who thought this way.  He recounted a story of one management group that 
proposed selling out to a German company2.  After many hours of debate the employees (members) 
narrowly threw out the proposal.  The management group was immediately replaced.  However, the 
fact that this debate took place illustrates that members have the same rights to capital growth and 
residual assets as shareholders in private companies, as well as effective control over the governing 
elite. 
Retained surpluses at Mondragon are reinvested either in the business or through corporate bodies 
(both charitable and commercial) serving the whole group of companies.  No surpluses are paid to 
external shareholders (these are not permitted) and reinvestment levels are extremely high.  
Additional finance, if required, is arranged through fixed and variable interest loans from a local 
bank. 
SoftContact Ltd originally modelled its arrangements for surplus sharing on Mondragon.  Individual 
accounts for the distribution of surpluses/losses were introduced in the mid 1990s and 100% of 
surpluses (after reinvestment decisions) were credited to them.  These were not held in a bank, 
however – they existed only on paper as part of the informal management accounts of the company.  
Nor did they appear in the audited company accounts.  Consequently, when members left – and 
should have received the proceeds from these accounts – the executive director responsible 
persuaded members that the company was justified in delaying payment.  In 2003, the company had 
to defend this position in a court case and lost. 
The spin off company pre-empted such a situation by changing to a system of shares.  Each 
employee received voting shares (1 for each of the first 5 years), and non-voting shares in proportion 
to their financial investment (minimum 15% of starting salary).  Surpluses were divided 50/50 
between staff bonuses and dividends for shareholders.  If any part of surplus is transferred to 
reserves, new shares have to be issued to existing members in recognition that this constitutes an 
                                                 
2
  Each member stood to make over 100,000 euros. 
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additional investment.  As at the other two companies employees had a majority stake in the residual 
assets of the organisation. 
Wages Rates 
The management rationale for the pay policy at Custom Products Ltd was discussed at one of the 
culture classes.  Salary bands were set on the basis of local market rates for particular jobs.  The 
stated intention was to protect jobs by creating a mechanism for distributing extra pay on the basis of 
company performance in the previous year.  A director made the case that increasing wages above 
market rates in good years could cause problems in subsequent years if the company did not perform 
well.  In short, setting wages too high could threaten jobs in the longer term.   
At an earlier class, members discussed how much input they had been able to give the pay review: 
There was disagreement about this.  It was given from the floor as an A2 decision3, but someone 
said it was fait accompli, people were not consulted.  Others argued with him and said they were 
given a chance to feedback.  But this person kept stressing it had come down from the top and was 
a fait accompli. 
Privately, some staff were unhappy at changes to the pay system.  One woman spoke about how 
demotivated she felt that the salary for her position had been capped.  Another anonymously sent me 
their response to a company survey on which extreme dissatisfaction was expressed.  One man spoke 
to me privately about the unfairness of the review and the fact that managers “had done very well out 
of it”.  When I talked up the profit related earnings scheme that had been introduced he said “let’s 
wait and see”.  His comments about managers' salaries were confirmed by a director; some managers 
had received increases as a result of the review; non-managerial salaries had remained the same. 
At SoftContact Ltd, there was a long history of equal pay (from 1979 to the mid 1990s4).  This was 
eventually replaced by pay for length of service in the mid 1990s in order to retain experienced 
members.  The ratio between the lowest and highest paid, however, was 1:2.  When the spin off 
                                                 
3
  An internal description of a decision where the framework has been set by managers but staff can suggest 
modifications to a proposal. 
4
  There was frequently an annual vote on whether to keep this policy.  In the early years of my employment this 
was supported by an overwhelming majority (14 to 1 in 1990, 11 to 1 in 1995).  It was not until the late 90s, 
after losing members with increasing family and mortgage commitments that the policy was changed to reward 
length of service. 
© Rory Ridley-Duff, 2004  Communitarian Governance 
MCA Conference, 2004 19 Herriot-Watt University, Edinburgh 
company was formed, graduated pay scales were replaced by a market salary assessment similar to 
that in operation at Custom Products Ltd and the ratio increased to 1:3.  To ensure accountability of 
both managers and staff to each other and changing social conditions, there was a requirement that 
salary levels be approved by a vote of all members5 and be subject to external mediation in the event 
of a dispute.  The Articles contain the following clauses: 
25 (g) An ordinary resolution of any shareholder class can require revaluation of any member’s 
Market Salary by an independent expert with experience of assessing local wage rates.  Any 
costs associated with revaluation will be borne by the shareholder class that proposed the 
resolution. 
This rule was designed to allow both workers and shareholders to control management pay and to 
counter the influence of managers’ direct control over workers’ pay.  It also allowed groups of 
workers to collectively challenge the pay of other groups (or a particular person) if they felt there 
was bias or favouritism.  To prevent a stalemate, parties had to agree to final arbitration at ACAS if 
no internal agreement could be reached6. 
The cultural and behavioural impact of the reward system at Custom Products Ltd is observable in a 
number of ways.  Each month, directors and managers give information to staff at a Figures Meeting.  
The importance of keeping costs down – in order to increase profit-share – was raised in two of the 
meetings I attended.  Indeed, the awareness of staff as to how their own work affected the 
commercial success of the organisation was something I spotted very early on: 
Nearly all the staff I have talked to seem commercially aware of their actions.  Neil talked to 
Misha and I about the issues in accepting products of marginal quality, and also about the 
purchasing decisions that affected cashflow and unit cost.  Of course, lots of people in the 
workplace will be commercially aware, but I felt there was an unusually high understanding of 
the need to avoid waste and ensure the fewest possible number of errors during the processing of 
an order. 
Every item of wastage was recorded in a book, and responsibility for the wastage was investigated 
and signed for by the relevant department manager.  Each month, departments would review their 
wastage performance against budget and look at the causes, and discuss ways to reduce it.  Although 
wastage was a small percentage (about 0.3% in the departmental meetings I attended), this was 
                                                 
5
  All employees became members and received one vote upon appointment. 
6
  Articles of Association, Rule 41. 
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translated into an amount per year and communicated in terms of money available to recruit new 
staff, or additional £s available for profit-share. 
The concern for quality control and commercial awareness was found in both the other case study 
companies.  All the Mondragon co-operatives and SoftContact’s spin off company had implemented 
ISO 9000 systems. 
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Constitutional Change 
In March 2003, two directors of Custom Products Ltd visited the Mondragon Corporacion 
Cooperativa (MCC) in Spain7.  They were considering a range of governance models from 
employee-ownership and co-operative organisations (from SoftContact Ltd, Baxi Investment Trust, 
Democratic Business Ltd, and Mondragon).  The stated aim was to protect both the company’s 
values and assets.  One drew attention several times to a text that discussed the separation of 
ownership and control (Ridley-Duff, 2002) and was keen to visit Mondragon to explore the way this 
separation worked in a corporation comprising some 190 member businesses (145 co-operatives and 
45 commercial partnerships).  The group has enjoyed significant commercial success – 57% of goods 
were exported internationally, staff numbers had grown to 67,000 and turnover approach €10 billion8 
worldwide.  Our host, Mikel, discussed the following governance model9: 
 
                                                 
7
  I accompanied the two directors, together with a colleague from the Sheffield Hallam University 
8
  Source: Field notes from presentation materials and annual reports handed out during the field trip. 
9
  Source: Handouts during seminar on governance 
Supreme Body General Assembly 
Account Auditors Watchdog Body 
Governing Council 
Managing Director 
Social Council 
Governing Body 
Executive Body 
Advisory Body 
Functional Departments 
Management Council 
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Within this structure, full members (typically 90% or more of those employed) have a vote in the 
General Assembly.  The General Assembly elects between 5 and 12 people to a Governing Council 
for 4 years (50% rotated every 2 years).  Key plans and policies are prepared by managers, discussed 
and approved by the Governing Council, then presented for debate and vote at an annual General 
Assembly.  In this way, the Governing Council not only has powers to appoint/remove the General 
Manager, but also control over which business plans and policies are presented to the whole 
organisation for discussion and approval.   
Our host described how he participated in some key debates and verified that the General Assembly 
has, on more than one occasion, forced the resignation of the Governing Council or Executive Body 
when it was perceived that they threatened the interests of the member company or the corporation.  
Key policies – such as management pay – could be debated for many hours before a vote took 
place10. 
Discussions during the field trip centred on the role that could be played by the Governing Council, 
and particular attention was given to the impact of non-executive members of the organisation 
serving on a governing body.  There was a frank discussion about the potential for conflict, and how 
support structures can help make this a constructive, rather than destructive experience. 
Mikel: It was a fight and also a political problem….a political something, they fight the blue 
collars workers. 
MD: Is that having a bad effect on the company’s performance?  Is that negatively affecting the 
company performance? 
Mikel:  Yes, in our opinion.  I am helping them as a coach to the Governing Council.  As a coach, 
because – as I told you before – they have to develop their three skills; communication skills; how 
we can make decisions; and the third one is leadership.  I am the coach of this Governing 
Council.  We speak sometimes about these problems, about the political problems, and this 
confrontation. They realise this not good. 
At Mondragon a management school provides induction training to Governing Council members, 
and then provides a mentor for a period of 2 years to assist with skill development.  The impact of 
Mondragon on one director at Custom Products Ltd was apparent in the company newsletter the 
following week: 
                                                 
10
  Source: Mikel Lezamiz participated in one debate lasting 5 hours and told us that the staff voted against 
proposals to link senior managers pay to market rates. 
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 We all came away thoroughly energised from the trip with many issues to ponder and consider.  
I see this trip as the start of a long and prosperous relationship with the Mondragon people.  We 
also now speak fluent Basque  (“Ya”!!) 
Over the next two months, I discussed the field trip at length with two directors.  We produced a 
governance model adapted to UK law incorporating elements from Mondragon.  This was submitted 
to the DTI and the board of Custom Products Ltd. 
There are a few key points to note in this model: 
• The Operating Board prepares proposals that are presented for discussion and approved by 
the General Council. 
• The General Council decides which proposals go the General Assembly for debate and 
company-wide approval. 
• The General Assembly has the power to reject proposals originated by the Operating Board. 
• The Governing Council is responsible for proposing changes in the constitution and terms of 
employment. 
In these early discussions, there was a wish to avoid creating an adversarial structure that was 
bureaucratic.  Fears were expressed about introducing an “extra level” and avoiding a “them and us”.  
There was concern that the introduction of new bodies would result in staff “avoiding existing 
structures” which were perceived to be working well.  In particular, there was a wish for discussion 
of policy to remain within Action Group Meetings (departmental staff meetings) rather than the 
General Assembly.  The proposals eventually put to the board are shown below: 
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Debates About the Governing Council 
A journal entry on 3rd June 2003 makes it clear that discussion originally centred on the authority of 
the Governing Council (GC). 
The MD feels the Governing Council members should not be directors at Companies House (that 
they should be from the Operating Board).  The current thinking is that the GC should govern the 
culture.  I wondered whether the GC would have sufficient influence if not containing any legal 
directors – that they should avoid a situation where the people who have a veto over business 
plans were overruling others who have legal responsibility for the business.  The Operating Board 
may not accept the authority of GC if it does not have any legal responsibility for the impact of its 
decisions. 
The understanding at this time was that the Governing Council (GC) would have decision-making 
powers to block policies and plans that it did not feel were ready for approval in the General 
Assembly.  Out of this discussion, it was also proposed that the legal board should comprise two 
Operating Board (OB) and two Governing Council members to ensure that both bodies had legal 
responsibility for its decisions.   
However, upon presenting these proposals to the full board, there was opposition from two of the 
five directors to the whole idea: 
 
Operating Board (OB) 
Development of Business 
Strategy  
Company Management and 
Business Planning 
General Assembly 
 
Stakeholders – Sovereign Body 
Approves/Rejects Proposals presented by the Governing Council 
Elects 
Appoint
Appoint
Managers & Teamleaders 
Action Group(s) 
Voting Rights 
Elects 
Governing Council  
Accepts/Rejects proposals of 
the Operating Board 
Controls changes to 
constitution and terms of 
employment 
Legal Board 
Legal Responsibility  
Managing Director + ? 
President + VP 
Appoint 
Executive Body 
Action Group(s) 
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There were objections from the board to the model.  It was seen as bureaucratic and had the 
potential to debilitate the company.  The MD feels the objections are understandable.  Others 
generally felt the new governance model may be unnecessary.  They questioned whether it was 
just a safety net.  There was also an issue regarding who may get voted onto the Governing 
Council.  One director put forward the positive impact that would result from people’s 
perceptions of ownership and involvement but he felt others probably don’t feel this. 
To discuss these objections, and win support, the two directors proposing the changes agreed to have 
one-to-one discussions with the others before bringing the issues back to future board meetings.  
At the next board meeting, new concerns were voiced.  Firstly, a board member wanted reassurance 
that the Governing Council (GC) would not be responsible for appraising senior managers’ 
performance.  After discussion, it was agreed this would apply only to the MD. 
Secondly, it was felt that the Governing Council (GC) should not have powers to block business or 
strategic plans and that it should only have responsibility for social policies.  Opinion converged on a 
view that the GC could act as “guardians of the culture”.  A summary document to the board 
(25th June 2003) outlined a decision agreed at the meeting: 
11. Further discussion will take place to clarify the social/commercial remits of the GC and OB.  
The consensus view was that the primary concern of the Governing Council was social, and 
the primary concern of the Operating Board was commercial. 
By the time the proposals were put to managers, the decision-making rights of the GC on social 
issues had been modified so that it would be “proactively consulted on the social impact of strategy”.  
Its powers, therefore, had been reduced so that it would act as an advisory body except in the key 
task of appointing the MD: 
The MD raised the election of his successor.  There was a big discussion.  Two directors wanted 
the GC only to have veto rights over the appointment of a future MD.  All others wanted the 
power of appointment the other way around.  They made the argument that the Operating Board 
(OB) may look at the appointment of a future MD from predominantly a management or 
operational perspective.  The existing MD put a scenario.  His successor resigns – the OB as a 
whole may be tarnished.  What then?  Should we allow a tarnished board to appoint its own MD?  
The others did not really have an answer. 
There were two key arguments against the OB appointing the MD; firstly, there would be a “circular 
problem of accountability” if the MD was responsible for appointing the other executives and vice 
versa; secondly, it may be necessary for an incoming MD to change the OB.  If the OB were 
responsible for the appointment of a new MD, they may be tempted to protect their own position 
rather than the interests of the company as a whole. 
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The issues over eligibility continued for the next two board meetings.  At the last board meeting I 
attended, the selection criteria were reviewed. 
There were 4 key criteria.  Firstly, that a person has been in the company for 2 years.  Secondly, 
that they have a clean disciplinary and grievance record for 2 years.  Thirdly, that they have 
attended an ‘orientation’ session to explain what is involved.  Lastly, that they agree to undergo 
training and assignments.  I felt the provision of disciplinary and grievance could be abused; a 
manager could accuse someone in order to prevent them standing for the council.  When I raised 
this, the board members were unanimous that this would only apply if a complaint was found to 
be justified.  I feel this clearly gives managers effective control over who can stand for the 
council. 
I compared the proposals to the other two case study companies.  At SoftContact Ltd, a person was 
eligible to vote after completing their probationary period (normally 6 months)11.  At SoftContact’s 
sister company, eligibility to vote started upon appointment12 and there were no restrictions on 
eligibility for directorship13.  At Mondragon, eligibility was tied to membership14 and training was 
given after election.  I clarified this in a follow up e-mail to two of the directors. 
I found in reviewing my notes from Mondragon, the training (cultural and management) takes 
place after a person has been elected (as something they need to fulfil their democratic duty) - it 
is not something they have to do to exercise their democratic rights.  I think, therefore, 
that the arrangements proposed are part of a re-discussion, re-negotiation of the mechanisms of 
management control - the culture still has key differences in this regard from those I've been part 
of before, or others we are studying.  In recognising this, I don't want you to think I'm for or 
against what has been proposed - it may well be this approach sustains your commercial 
advantage and none of us would want to throw that away. 
The Social Council 
Initially the MD took the following view about the Social Council: 
I don’t even know whether we need to go there.  The Social Council – we could see why in a 500 
staff company it was necessary.  But we don’t believe in 500 staff companies (laughs). 
                                                 
11
  Conditions of employment, clause 3. 
12
  Article 3a (i) 
13
  Article 13 defines members rights in General Meeting, which include standing for directorship.  Articles 21a, b, 
c and d define the voting process. 
14
  Mondragon Article 11 and 12, quoted in Oakeshott (1990:187) 
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It was quickly dismissed as inappropriate for a company with just over 100 staff.  Whyte and Whyte 
(1991), however, found that the first social council was formed when Mondragon co-operatives had 
only 50 members.  It was intended from the outset to provide a voice for marginalised workers and 
became a key forum for non-managerial staff and staff representing the views of external bodies (e.g. 
trade unions).  The only strike on record at Mondragon was triggered, in part, by a failure of the 
social councils to represent the views of a marginalised minority. 
Its practical role, despite its formal constitution as an advisory body, often included negotiation with 
managers on issues typically handled by trade unions.  Its ambiguous position in the constitution – as 
a communication body chaired by the President – resulted in a mixed history with both executives 
and grass roots activists using it to influence debate.  After repeated calls for the Social Council to 
elect its own chair from its membership, the Governing Council finally conceded control.  Even with 
this, the effectiveness of the Social Councils is still highly variable across the corporation15. 
Constitutional Change at SoftContact Ltd 
SoftContact Ltd was originally a company limited by Guarantee and registered under the Industrial 
and Provident Societies Act.  All members have 1 vote and 1 share after completing their 
probationary period.  There are no external shareholders.  A different conception of management and 
governance existed in the early 1990s.  Management was conceived as a series of functions 
distributed amongst the members of the company according to the willingness and skills of members 
to undertake them.  Care was taken to ensure that functions were rotated amongst members in 
accordance with their personal development wishes.  Upon completing their probationary period, 
each member was expected to take on one or more management task to ensure no-one had a 
monopoly on management power. 
Over time, however, the competence of some people in a range of management skills resulted in 
others deferring to them (by choice or necessity) with the result that they came to be seen as “expert” 
in one or other area of technical or personal management.  Their responsibility for these tasks 
intensified when other members left and new members were recruited and over time they became de 
facto - rather than appointed – managers but without any powers to discipline other members of staff.   
                                                 
15
  We discussed this with our host during our field trip who confirmed that effectiveness often depended on the 
commitment of the membership to use it and the strength of support amongst Governing Council members.  In 
some co-operatives senior staff championed the Social Councils but others were much more lukewarm. 
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This understanding of management as a social process, in which some people emerge as managers 
(whether desired or not) was captured in a discussion paper (see page 15).  The impact this 
eventually had on formal governance arrangements is outlined in a statement to a court case in 2003. 
In the London office, there was collective management until December 2000, although longer 
serving members often played important roles in the organisation, led discussions and prepared 
proposals for group consideration.  In the Yorkshire office, while staff were consulted and 
involved in changes in their own sphere of work, there was a line management arrangement. 
In December 2000 I put proposals forward to the General Meeting that we should elect two 
executive directors and a General Manager to steer the company back to profitability…The 
General Meeting elected two members to the position of executive director, and elected me to the 
position of General Manager.  I reported to the executive directors.  Monthly General Meetings 
gave way to monthly executive meetings and quarterly General Meetings.  The executive directors 
and General Manager still reported to (and were accountable to) the General Meeting – decisions 
made at General Meeting were the highest authority in the company.  There was a clear 
management structure – but managers were constitutionally accountable to the members of the 
company (its employees). 
When establishing a sister company (Limited by Shares), this view of management as a set of social 
and technical functions was extended to the reward system.  Salary bands were linked to local market 
rates and also to the extent that a person had developed along their evolutionary path.  Changes to 
the reward system were subject to a vote of all members.  In practice, pay levels and the empirical 
evidence needed to verify an evolutionary progression were agreed with a representative of each job 
function.  In this way, a person’s current salary, job title and career progression opportunities were 
established. 
After formal line management arrangements were introduced, the kinds of disputes typical in 
conventional companies began to surface.  One employee claimed that I “had too much power”.  
Later a person threatened an industrial tribunal if his terms and conditions of employment were 
changed against his wishes16.  The company introduced 360° appraisals in 2000 so it is possible to 
compare feedback before and after my appointment as CEO.  Appraisals started to contain more 
critical and mixed comments:  
                                                 
16
  In the period from 1979 to 2001, during which members had 1 vote in all management meetings, there was no 
occasion when a person threatened an industrial tribunal during periods of poor trading performance. 
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“Good at putting view over, perhaps could give appearance of listening better” 17 
 “Does not listen to queries, you interrupt & anticipate questions”   
“Listened better and more widely this period” 
“Your plan is the ‘only’ plan”18 
Later, however two members of staff swore on oath that I “was very good at discussing matters”19: 
“…the business was run on democratic lines and [the CEO] adhered to this principle by 
consulting everybody throughout my time there.  I was given a voting share and believed that I 
was entitled to an equal say to everybody else.”20 
Active discussion and debate about my powers and relationship skills became more contentious after 
my promotion to CEO.  This suggests that changes in relationship dependencies may be more 
important than personal characteristics. 
In the next section, I review the cultural, governance and ownership characteristics of the case study 
companies and outline a theory to illustrate how communitarian values are manifest in business 
forms.  Lastly, I develop a philosophical framework that illustrates the contrast with prevailing views 
based on liberal philosophical assumptions and use this to reassess the three case study companies. 
Discussion 
The data provides evidence of communitarian values in start-up, medium size and large scale 
organisations but only in the formal statements of organisation culture.    Custom Products Ltd has 
adopted a communitarian position on rights and responsibilities (Etzioni, 1998).  Rights are not 
absolute – they depend on members’ acceptance of corresponding responsibilities.  Fulfilling 
                                                 
17
  All comments from Rory Ridley-Duff v The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Claim No 2800131/2003. 
(Witness bundle, p197-209) 
18
  Company records show this was not true, only a perception on the part of this employee.  A ‘Contingency 
Business Plan’ was prepared in advance of trading on 26th November 2001.  This was later revised for potential 
investors on 08 February 2002. 
19
  Witness Statement (Software Developer) 
20
  Witness Statement (Company Administrator) 
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responsibilities are conceptualised as something that protects the common good, and makes it 
possible for individuals to pursue choices and have their rights protected. 
Both the other case study companies subscribe to the notions of rights and responsibilities.  At 
Mondragon, this is expressed primarily as equilibrio – a balancing of interests in all domains of 
administration and decision-making.  At SoftContact Ltd, they are expressed as obligations through 
which a person earns their rights.  However, it is only at Custom Products Ltd that the idea has been 
developed to the point where rights and responsibilities are formally defined in contractual and 
constitutional documents.  It offers a clear example of liberal communitarian ideas affecting formal 
organisation. 
The focus on rights and responsibilities is expressed throughout the culture at Custom Products Ltd.  
In materials presented to potential recruits, in interviews, induction sessions, culture classes, 
“community pillars” are discussed in terms of rights and responsibilities.   The design of the 
recruitment process, and the manner in which the culture is disseminated shows awareness of 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957).  This is likely to draw people into the culture more quickly and 
accelerate their acceptance of its underlying values. 
Pay Policies 
All the case study companies embraced the principle of market-related salaries and surplus sharing, 
although the levels and constitutional arrangements varied considerably.  At Custom Products Ltd, 
there were three ways that surpluses were shared; dividends, profit-share, profit related earnings.  
About half of the staff were only eligible for profit share (as they held no shares) and the level was 
set depending on profits at between 5% and 12.5%.  At Mondragon, up to 45% of profits are 
distributed to individual “social accounts” (Oakeshott, 1990; Field Notes, 2003) and other 
contributions are made to corporate bodies servicing the company.  Arrangements are SoftContact 
Ltd were more ad-hoc, but modelled on arrangements at Mondragon. 
There are signs, therefore, that workers as well as senior managers and shareholders are being treated 
as part of a shared community (Tam, 1999).  Surplus sharing is a value embedded in the culture of all 
companies not a scheme introduced to increase productivity.  This means that the company can be 
held to account through the courts if it does not honour the terms of any agreement.  Customers are 
only recognised as stakeholders in some of the Mondragon organisations, however.  Suppliers, while 
not formally recognised as stakeholders in any of the companies are sometimes invited to major 
company events indicating that they do have informal recognition. 
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Governance 
All case study companies adopted the principle of one-member one-vote for some aspects of 
governance and decision-making.  Voting is not dependant on the size of the shareholding, although 
in all cases there is a minimum financial contribution required before voting rights are granted.  The 
range of issues that members can vote on varied from company to company. 
At SoftContact and its spin off company, the principle of one-member one-vote was well established.  
This originally extended to all aspects of management, but later it was restricted to debate and 
approval of proposals brought by managers and executive directors to General Meeting.  In the spin 
off company, the position was further restricted to constitutional changes, policy, business planning 
and the election of directors, leaving the executive freer to run the operational aspects of the 
company.  Voting became linked to labour investment rather than financial investment, although the 
cap (at 5 votes) was designed to enable members to ‘earn’ equality and prevent those with many 
years service from outvoting other dedicated members of staff. 
At Mondragon, the principle of one-member one-vote was also well established, and the division 
between governance and operational management is explicitly recognised in the corporate structure.  
The Governing Council works with – but also controls – the executive, while the members of the 
organisation (its employees) have influence and limited control over the Governing Council.  In 
many ways, the organisational arrangements are similar to SoftContact’s spin off company where the 
directors were elected by the workforce and then appointed the top executive to organise the 
company.  The top executive was formally expected to work with other directors on strategic and 
business planning issues, prepare and present proposals for discussion at General Meeting.  Members 
– in General Meeting – could remove the directors, and the directors could remove the top executive, 
if required. 
At Custom Products Ltd, the proposed arrangements are slightly more complex.  The Operating 
Board – by reducing the powers of the Governing Council - retains much of its current 
decision-making powers.  As these constitutional arrangements have only just been approved, it is 
not possible to evaluate how they will play out in practice.  Nevertheless, the current proposals point 
towards a management preference to use existing line-management structures to control discussion of 
new policy developments and business plans.  This restricts the democratic assembly and governing 
body to a narrower range of powers. 
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The power relationship between the Operating Board and the Governing Council chosen by Custom 
Products Ltd – except in the area of appointing the MD – is the reverse of Mondragon.  In 
Mondragon, the key decision-making body is the Governing Council (see Whyte and Whyte, 1991, 
Field Notes, 2003) which can accept, refuse or refer a matter to a vote of the whole company.  
Although our field visit confirmed that the Governing Council accepted the advice of professional 
managers about 98% of the time, the onus was on the management team to satisfy the elected 
representatives, and not on the elected representatives to persuade the management team.  
The final proposals put to staff at Custom Product Ltd for the Governing Council are strikingly 
similar to the Social Council at Mondragon.  Its formal responsibilities are to advise rather than 
decide on the social impact of changes proposed by the Operating Board.  Evidence from 
Mondragon, however, suggests that it may become a structure that moves beyond its formal role to 
challenge and negotiate with the executive on a range of issues (Whyte and Whyte, 1991; 
Kasmir, 1996). 
In all cases, forums are used for debating policy.  At Custom Products Ltd appointed managers 
facilitate these, whereas in the other two case study companies the forums are chaired by elected 
representatives.  In all companies there are practices (or proposals) to enable employees to decide 
who has the responsibility of working with and controlling the executive.  While the extent of 
participation varies, and changes over time, there is convergence on a distinct position where an 
elected body appoints and is formally responsible for controlling the executive.  The elected body 
does not run the company directly, it delegates this authority to a professional management team. 
There is both representative democracy and direct democracy in all companies although the balance 
and effectiveness varies in each case.  In SoftContact Ltd, monthly – and later quarterly meetings – 
were open democratic forums at which anybody could bring proposals for discussion and debate.  
Proposals were circulated in advance to give people time to prepare questions and arguments.  There 
was a tendency, particularly over time, for these proposals to be brought by those with management 
responsibilities, but it remained the case that – constitutionally at least – anyone could advance 
proposals before a meeting and add them to the meeting agenda. 
At Mondragon, proposals are vetted by an elected body, but thereafter presented for open debate in 
the General Assembly.  Field data confirmed that proposals are forwarded to the Governing and 
Social Councils in advance of discussion in the General Assembly giving all parties time to prepare 
questions and arguments.  Primary and secondary data suggests that debate can be vigorous and 
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genuinely democratic (Whyte and Whyte 1991; Cheney 1999; Field Notes 2003), particularly on 
matters that affect everybody or which challenge the core values of the organisation.  Although 
control of the agenda is in the hands of elected representatives, company-wide debate is possible and 
discussion in forums that do not include managers should ensure that divergent points of view can be 
more freely discussed.  The result is an inclusive culture in which economic expediency and 
managerial whim are balanced with the social objectives of the organisation. 
At Custom Products Ltd, meeting agendas are controlled by the executive and managers but there is 
an opportunity for open debate in departmental Action Group Meetings.  Empirical data suggests that 
debate is lively on departmental issues of direct concern to the participants, but the way new policy 
proposals are introduced to managers and staff across the company may stifle rather than increase 
democratic debate. 
On the basis of direct observation, the practices at Custom Products Ltd are at variance with the other 
case studies.  While there are opportunities between presentation and finalisation for individuals to 
feedback and affect the proposals, feedback is channelled through managers rather the elected 
representatives.  The rationale for this is that it gives all people a chance to contribute and therefore 
contributes to wider democracy and greater debate.  Some writers, however, would regard these 
arrangements as managerialist (Parker, 2002) or examples of a “subtle and manipulative” form of 
normative control (Kunda, 1992:15) which stifle genuine debate.  Employees own views were mixed.  
Many are publicly enthusiastic; some look to others for a lead; some openly (or privately) object. 
The dissemination process itself utilises techniques that give the impression of free-choice but which 
some participants object to.  As Aronson points out (2003:151): 
People are not passive receptacles for the deposition of information.  The manner in which they 
view and interpret information depends on how deeply they are committed to a particular belief or 
course of action.  Individuals will distort the objective world in order to reduce their dissonance. 
It can be argued that the presentation techniques used will maximise the chances of winning support 
but reduce democratic debate.  None of the techniques recommended by Berry and Robert (1984) to 
increase democratic debate are in evidence; executives do not circulate proposals in advance of 
presenting them; non-managerial staff are not able to speak to company members as a whole and 
cannot originate alternative strategic proposals.  Those who prepare and present the proposals 
dominate the discourse and the quality and quantity of debate in sub-groups is mediated by and fed 
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back through managers.  The company consultations are a far cry from Habermas’s “ideal speech 
situation” (Johnson and Duberley, 2000:121). 
On a more positive note, managers do consult widely and take care to allow everyone to contribute.  
The process of consultation also appears to be efficient and effective.  The direction of change is also 
to increase representative democracy alongside direct participation.  The elected body will increase 
the voice of non-executive staff at the early stages of policy discussion.  The power to appoint and 
remove the managing director will mean that the top executive, for the first time, is answerable to an 
elected body.  This will increase the accountability of the whole executive to the workforce 
(particularly if members have direct access to elected representatives and vice versa). 
The constraints on eligibility, however, reduce the credibility of the Governing Council as a 
democratic body.  Members must show commitment to the company by attending the culture classes 
before they can stand for election.  They must also work for two years, keep a clean disciplinary and 
grievance record, attend orientation sessions and agree to take management training.  At the other 
companies, appointment or completion of a short probationary period are the only criteria.  While it 
can be argued that these arrangements are to protect the company, it leaves managers and directors 
with control mechanisms that can prevent an ‘undesirable’ from standing for election even if they 
have popular support. 
Whether through shares or co-operative membership, all the case study companies encouraged 
employee-ownership and this increases the social pressure to communicate plans, ideas and involve 
members in the running of the company.  The explicit intention in all cases was to limit the influence 
of external parties, increase the control of internal stakeholders, and ensure that the organisations 
could not be sold, closed down, or merged with another organisation without the consent of 
recognised stakeholders. 
Management Hegemony 
The rationale for management hegemony at SoftContact Ltd and Custom Products Ltd differs 
considerably even though the outward form appears similar.  In the former, it was rationalised that 
managers evolved as a result of accumulated skills and dependencies.  Eventually, de facto managers 
were recognised formally in the structure.  At Custom Products Ltd, the cognitive model used to 
identify and select managers was grounded in the executive’s belief in its own right to select people 
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for promotion.  The use of formal assessments, designed to evaluate compatibility with the culture 
and values, is an aid in this process.   
The significance here is in recognising that different cognitive systems were derived out of their 
social contexts.  The entrepreneur-led company understood promotion as the responsibility of those 
at the top of the hierarchy; those wishing to be promoted had to show their commitment to the values 
upheld by the executive rather than those manifest in peer-groups.  While it can be authentically 
claimed the values have been agreed in workshops, the interpretation of those values remains in the 
hands of managers and directors.  In practice, it is the interpretations that give the culture its 
character and not the forums that originally decided the wording, or the words themselves. 
The influence of the MD remains unclear.  Given that he held 55% of voting shares, it is difficult to 
determine the final mix of motives that brought about support for democratisation.  His power to 
influence the careers of the other board members is likely to affect their ability to voice all their 
concerns.  When faced with proposed changes, the immediate reaction of some was to ask why 
anything needed to be changed at all.  It took one-to-one discussions and three board meetings to 
convince sceptical directors to support the proposals.  Reactions included concern for their own 
accountability, concern over the loss of decision-making rights, concern over the qualities of the 
people who may be elected to govern, all of which were rooted in a general concern not to “rock the 
boat”. 
On one level, we can see individuals asking questions and raising concerns that can be interpreted as 
a protection of their own interests, or the interests of the board as a whole.  On another level, we see 
the board backing the MD’s suggestion over the appointment of his successor, on the basis that the 
company’s interests are more important than their own.  An optimistic view is that there was a 
genuine concern not to change a winning formula and that the directors were concerned to maintain 
economic stability.  A pessimistic view would be that individuals acted so as not to lose their 
influence and control over anything they currently controlled.  With hindsight, we can see that a 
considerable number of concessions had to be offered before all board members backed the changes.  
The evidence suggests that the minority in favour could only win the support of others by satisfying 
their concerns and ensuring a balance between economic stability and democracy.  Those 
concessions, it could be argued, did not halt the progress towards greater economic democracy, but 
resulted in limited progress towards social democracy.  All but one of the powers available to 
members of the other two case study companies were discarded during negotiations. 
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At SoftContact Ltd promotion was understood as the responsibility of the peer group; those wishing 
to advance had to demonstrate de facto technical or social leadership qualities to win the support of 
colleagues.  I draw attention to this dynamic with reference to French and Raven’s theory of power 
(1958) in a text written for social entrepreneurs (Ridley-Duff, 2002:43) 
As co-operatives mature and grow, they usually evolve management structures based on 
representative democracy….Managers are significantly more accountable to the enterprise’s 
workers than is the case in a private limited company.  This has a profound effect on the style of 
management and the manner in which leadership can be exercised. 
Some co-operatives limit (or prevent) managers’ use of coercive or reward power to influence 
their subordinates.  Their legitimacy rests more on the referent and expert power that they can 
establish. 
The above example shows how rationales for management hegemony are a function of the social 
contexts that produce them.  In the case of SoftContact Ltd managers were eventually accepted, but 
the understanding that evolved from that process resulted in future arrangements that would depend 
on the continuing approval of subordinates, peers and directors.  At Custom Products Ltd, the 
understandings continue to evolve centred on the approval of board members.  The example supports 
the findings of social psychology regarding rational self-justification (Aronson, 2003).  In both cases, 
the arrangements for the selection of future leaders were derived from rational self-justifications of 
past actions. 
In comparing Custom Products Ltd to Mondragon, there are both differences and similarities in 
underlying assumptions.  At Mondragon managers are hired on 4 year contracts.  While their position 
as workers are secure, their position as managers are subject to the control of the (elected) Governing 
Council.  This means that instead of line managers being in a position of power over workers’ 
contracts, workers are in a position of power over managers’ contracts. 
At the executive and grassroots level, the power relations between workers and managers at 
Mondragon are typically the reverse of Custom Products Ltd.  At the middle-management level, 
however, they are similar.  All companies eventually opted for middle-managers responsible for 
day-to-day operational management, pastoral and technical support, discipline and service levels. 
While it is true that managers at Mondragon have the power to remove people, this is balanced by the 
power of the workforce’s representatives to terminate a manager’s contract (as a manager) or to 
overturn the manager’s decision in a democratic forum.  This is a very sophisticated balance of 
power.  At Custom Products Ltd, the only person proposed to have this right is the 
Managing Director.  However, this may be the first step in a change which sees power gradually 
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transferred from a sovereign entrepreneur to a sovereign body comprising the whole workforce.  At 
present the two organisation’s power structures belie their different social roots, but the precedent 
has been set for an employee to argue their case for continued employment in a democratic forum 
and it will be instructive to see whether this right is extended to all members in due course. 
We can state with some confidence that communitarian values are deeply embedded in the formal 
culture at Custom Products Ltd and there is evidence of these values in the formal culture of the other 
case study companies.  These findings are themselves quite unusual and are indicative of concrete 
attempts to democratise the workplace for both commercial and social advantage.  The disquiet 
amongst some staff at Custom Products Ltd, however, and Kasmir’s study of Mondragon (1996), 
makes it less clear that formal organisation structures, or statements of culture, are able to influence 
the informal culture of an organisation.  This seems to be determined more by the social dynamics 
between individuals in positions of influence, the social dynamics within and between different peer 
groups, and their relationship to those at management level.  Whether behaviour results from 
calculative compliance, identification or internalisation (Kelman, 1961) is not always clear, and it 
may arise from the “culture trap” identified by Kunda (1992:224): 
Culture is not a prison and managers are neither jailers nor tyrants in the simple sense of the 
word, but it does, nevertheless, represent a rather subtle form of domination. 
Taking all this together, we can relate the practices back to the literature and outline the principles 
and business practices within a philosophical framework.  This enables us to contrast the ideas of 
communitarian and liberal thought. 
A Theory of Communitarian Business 
Communitarian organisations are not necessarily the outcome of a socialist ideology.  Handy 
(2001:61) remarked on “the oddity that giants of the free market were themselves centrally-
controlled totalitarian states, the antithesis of all that they abhorred politically”.  Skoble (1994:3) 
specifically links communitarian values to corporatism. 
Corporatism as a commercial mode parallels communitarianism as a social theory.  The idea of 
being a “team player” in the corporate hierarchy parallels the idea of contributing to the 
“common good” in social theory.  In communitarian social thought, each person is supposed to 
subordinate individual preferences (in varying degrees) to the good of the community, and indeed, 
frame his or her conception of self-interest in terms of service to the community.  In the 
corporation, each employee is supposed to think of individual needs in terms of the needs of the 
company. 
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Corporate businesses have such dispersed ownership (through pension funds, trusts, individual 
shareholders etc.) that no single person or institution can control their operation.  In this sense, it can 
be argued that the separation of ownership and control is not dissimilar to communitarian 
organisations that are commonly owned (Limited by Guarantee) or state controlled.  Control is 
achieved through political affiliations and networks of social influence rather than through the 
application of economic muscle (see Sloman and Sutcliffe, 2001: 41).  We can regard these as 
extreme forms of communitarian organisation. 
In Nove’s (1985) exploration of feasible socialism, he recognised a need to combine state or 
corporate bodies with other socialised enterprises that were privately or co-operatively owned.  He 
contrasts the necessity of hierarchical management in large-scale organisation with the need for 
executive accountability through political structures normally found only in civil society.  Nove’s 
work attempts to integrate communitarian values with liberal political principles and stands alongside 
the literature on a pluralist and liberal democratic approach to corporate governance (see Rothschild 
and Whitt, 1986; Cornforth, 1988, 1995; Oakeshott, 1990; Morrison, 1991; Cheney, 1999; Major and 
Boby, 2000; Coad and Cullen, 2001; Ridley-Duff, 2002; Johnson, 2004).   
The table below attempts to identify and divide the key assumptions that underpin three distinct 
philosophies in business.  Of course, in real life the boundaries do not exist and values evolve on a 
continuum between extreme communitarian and liberal positions.  However, the typology allows us 
to re-examine the case study companies and place them within this philosophical framework. 
Table 1 – Key Assumptions and Objectives 
Communitarian Liberal Communitarian  Liberal 
State Socialism / Corporate Capitalism Market Socialism / Socially Responsible 
Capitalism 
Free-Market Capitalism 
Fulfilment through subordination of the 
self to the common good 
Balanced private/public, social/economic 
behaviour (equilibrio) 
Fulfilment through autonomy 
Indivisible Ownership Mixed collective/private ownership 
(shared ownership) 
Private ownership 
Governance as the protection of 
collective interests 
Governance as the alignment of 
stakeholder interests (pluralism) 
Governance as the protection of 
shareholder interests 
Culture as a product of collective Culture as a product of social dialogue Culture as a product of charismatic 
© Rory Ridley-Duff, 2004  Communitarian Governance 
MCA Conference, 2004 39 Herriot-Watt University, Edinburgh 
Communitarian Liberal Communitarian  Liberal 
responsibility and social interaction leadership 
Collective Wealth (Public Property) Shared Wealth (Public / Private Property) Private Wealth (Private Property) 
The characteristics of companies that are influenced by (or have evolved) a liberal communitarian 
position could be regarded as attempts to modify prevailing social relations.  They design governance 
systems that acknowledge the interests of different groups and specifically acknowledge stakeholders 
that are normally excluded from governance.  In this sense, such organisations can be regarded as 
“social enterprises” (Ridley-Duff 2002:64; DTI, 2003) with business goals rooted in social 
transformation.  When we consider the business practices that are evident in the empirical data, we 
can suggest a typography that will predict the divergent formal statements about company culture 
and objectives. 
Table 2 – Business Practices 
Business Practice Communitarian Liberal Communitarian Liberal 
Underlying Philosophy Society improves through the 
development of shared values 
Society improves when private 
individuals pursue social goals 
Society improves through the 
pursuit of personal goals 
Relationship Orientation Communal Mutual Benefit Personal Benefit 
Primary Focus Social (People) Integrated Capital Accumulation (Money) 
Primary Resource Capital Integrated Labour  
Attitude to Workers Fair treatment determined by 
cultural norms 
Fair treatment based on 
humanistic principles 
Fair treatment determined by market 
conditions 
Management Philosophy Participative Integrated Hierarchical 
Business Outcomes Collective Management / 
Indivisible Ownership 
Elected Management / Mixed 
Ownership 
Autocratic Management / Private 
Ownership 
Primary Beneficiaries Members Stakeholders Investors 
We can now reinterpret the formal organisation of the three case study companies remembering 
always that organisations change over time and are subject to different dynamics and influences at 
different stages of their development.  We also need to be mindful that organisations are not 
monolithic.  Even in their formal organisation, different parts of an organisation can embrace 
different approaches. 
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Custom Products Ltd is moving from extreme liberal and communitarian positions to a more 
integrated liberal communitarian position.  Philosophically, there is an acceptance of the market and 
social responsibility.  Since visiting Mondragon, there has been much talk of equilibrio and concrete 
attempts to adopt this in practice (balance between a governing council and executive, a balance of 
influence on the legal board).  The current private ownership arrangements are being changed in 
favour of mixed collective/private ownership. 
In some respects, however, it still holds to more extreme communitarian positions.  The language and 
practice of governance is oriented towards corporate capitalism and collective interest rather than the 
protection of individuals.  Responsibilities are stressed more than rights.  In political structures and 
assumptions, the outlook is “unitary” (Darwin, Johnson, McCawley, 2002) and there is a 
presumption that directors do (and should) speak for the whole community.  There is a presumption 
that everyone does (or should) share the same interests.   
The resistance by board members individually and collectively to submit themselves to the decisions 
of an elected body suggests that the organisation is uncomfortable with a pluralist outlook on 
political organisation and policy debate.  Indeed, the signs are that board members prefer the current 
approach where an operating board is responsible for framing the key policy debates and consults 
others in the final stages of a proposal.  Democratisation is intended to improve the existing 
consultation process rather than introduce a fundamentally new outlook.  This unitary outlook is also 
reflected in the trend towards the elimination of external investor influence. 
SoftContact Ltd has also evolved its position between communitarian and liberal communitarian 
positions.  Originally it had extreme communitarian positions on collective ownership, governance 
and wealth sharing, but these were combined with a strong culture protecting individual rights (to a 
voice, to a vote) and personal sovereignty through the application of egalitarian principles in 
management.  It accepted the disciplines of the market and social objectives.  Over time, however, 
some of these positions softened to allow mixed ownership, elected rather than collective 
management, and an erosion of individual rights in favour of a perceived collective interest. 
In its approach to ownership and control, SoftContact Ltd moved to a liberal communitarian position, 
encouraging external organisations and individuals to become shareholders and all members to use 
their voice in democratic forums.  Its constitution explicitly recognises investors as a separate class 
of shareholder with their own interests and elected board members.  While the balance is tipped 
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towards employees during periods of profitability, the balance changes if their decisions damage the 
commercial interests of other stakeholders.  In these circumstances investors assume control. 
Mondragon has a long history, but its organisation shows a consistent commitment to the liberal 
communitarian position through the pursuit of equilibrio.  While some commentators draw attention 
to the collective nature of ownership, there is – in a very real sense – both a personal and collective 
dimension.  While external organisations cannot hold shares, the corporation has strong contractual 
relationships with the suppliers of capital and formally allows external bodies to have influence 
through a variety of structures. 
There is an especially strong commitment to dialogue and self-criticism, and to the creation of 
structures that give a voice to stakeholders that are normally marginalised by shareholders.  These 
structures do not always work effectively, but the responsiveness and self-reflection of corporate 
bodies to a strike in the mid-1970s, and subsequent strong economic performance and workforce 
commitment, lends support to the argument that the political arrangements provide roughly the right 
balance. 
Concluding Comments 
Aronson (2003) looks at how cognitive dissonance is produced by differences between former and 
current social contexts, and our tendency to engage in rational self-justification to protect our 
individual self-concept as good and decent people.  Where the social context induces a new choice – 
and there is little coercion – a person rapidly internalises the values and attitudes implicit in this new 
behaviour and incorporates it into their value system. 
His analysis, therefore, suggests a reason for the divergence of views and ways of thinking observed 
by earlier philosophers.  If we take Aronson’s argument to its logical conclusion, we can expect 
people pursuing self-interest to attempt to justify (rationalise) their own behaviour by looking for 
positive outcomes from their self-interested behaviour.  People who, other the other hand, pursue and 
defend relationships will attempt to rationalise their behaviour in terms of the positive outcomes that 
they perceive from the protection of these relationships. 
We can, therefore, suggest a social root for individualist and communitarian philosophies.  Perhaps 
those who were influenced by their social context to behave in a self-interested way will evolve (and 
be drawn to) individualist philosophies.  Conversely, those who were influenced by the social context 
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to engage in equitable relationships will evolve (and be drawn to) liberal communitarian 
philosophies.   
Where such individuals engage in business activities, they bring their personal philosophies into play 
and evolve working practices that give expression to their values.  These, however, will modify over 
time as social constraints limit the choice of possible behaviours resulting in modified philosophies 
and cognitive models.  The evidence presented here suggests there is a tendency to move towards a 
liberal communitarian approach over time in organisations committed to balancing the twin demands 
of economic efficiency and social democracy. 
The acceptance of market disciplines and some form of hierarchy, but subjecting the executive to 
selection and control processes by those they govern, can be seen as a distinct approach that differs 
from collective management or unfettered control by the owner(s).  If implemented, it would change 
economics dramatically by preventing the sale or merger of organisations unless the stakeholders 
(rather than only shareholders or employees) in both companies accepted the changes.  It would also 
discourage speculative short-term investments in favour of long term value-adding economic 
activity.  In accepting the market and a distributed network of smaller, closely interrelated production 
units, a liberal communitarian approach differs markedly from more extreme communitarian 
approaches which seek to supplant or distort the market with centralised or monopoly control of 
production, planning and decision-making. 
Any communitarian commitments stand in contrast with traditional liberal views linking personal 
sovereignty over life, liberty and property to the primacy of person freedom and autonomy.  The 
laissez-faire tradition (Smith, 1776; Friedman, 1962; Rawls, 1999) not only focuses on rolling back 
community or state intervention in commercial life, but also prioritises the rights of private 
individuals to ownership, and shareholder prerogatives to establish a chain of command in which 
they control managers, who in turn control workers. 
Further research into the way social contexts affect our attitudes to governance would be helpful in 
the context of the current government’s interest in social enterprise (DTI 2002; DTI 2003).  Liberal 
communitarian models of governance – rooted in recognition of multiple stakeholders within a 
market economy – would probably be helpful in developing (and recruiting) social entrepreneurs.  It 
may also benefit business advisers in economic development units that advise social enterprises, and 
social entrepreneurs.  Conventional models of governance based on individualist philosophies and 
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economics are unlikely to be attractive to this sector, or offer a structure that can facilitate the social 
transformation that is often desired. 
Outlining the business practices that characterise the case study companies do not – in themselves – 
satisfactorily explain why the individuals who founded them adopted communitarian forms, or the 
contexts that encourage communitarian behaviour.  Nor does it suggest how communitarian values 
can be embedded and institutionalised in the informal culture of an organisation or even whether 
these are desirable.  Further research in this area would be helpful to understand the contexts which 
promote communitarian behaviour, and the forms of organisation that might sustain it over long 
periods.  This would be particularly useful to those committed to corporate social responsibility, 
social enterprise and the socialisation of the economy. 
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